1. Public choice in perspective, Dennis C. Mueller;

Part I. The Need for and Forms of Cooperation:
2. Economic theories of the state, Russell Hardin;
3. Neither markets nor states: linking transformation processes in collective-action arenas, Elinor Ostrom and James Walker;
4. The political economy of Federalism, Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld;
5. The public choice of international organizations, Bruno S. Frey;
6. Constitutional public choice, Dennis C. Mueller;

Part II. Voting Rules and Preference Aggregation:
7. Cycling and majority rule, James M. Enelow;
8. Majority rule, Douglas W. Rae and Eric Schickler;
9. Group choice and individual judgments,H. Peyton Young;
10. Some paradoxes of preference aggregation, Prasanta K. Pattanaik;
11. Voting and the revelation of preferences for public activities, T. Nicolaus Tideman;

Part III. Electoral Politics:
12. The spatial analysis of elections and committees: four decades of research, Peter C. Ordeshook;
13. Multiparty electoral politics, Norman Schofield;
14. Interest groups: money, information and influence, David Austen Smith;
15. Logrolling, Thomas Stratmann;
16. Political business cycles, Martin Paldam;

Part IV. Individual Behavior and Collective Action:
17. When is it rational to vote? John H. Aldrich;
18. Voting behavior, Morris P. Fiorina;
19. Public Choice Experiments, Elizabeth Hoffman;

Part V. Public Choice in Action:
20. Modern bureaucratic theory, Ronald Wintrobe;
21. The positive theory of public bureaucracy, Terry Moe;
22. The political economy of taxation, Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer;
23. Rent seeking, Robert D. Tollison;
24. Endogenous protection: a survey Stephen P. Magee;